>From: "Peter McWilliams" >Subject: Prime-time propaganda >Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2000 10:53:31 -0800 >X-Mozilla-Status: 8001 >X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000 > > You may wonder why I call the LA Times one of the most pro-Drug-War major >newspapers in the country. Compate its tepid reporting with the article it >acknowledges as its source. > > THIS is excellent journalism. > > Enjoy, > > Peter > > > > http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/01/13/drugs/index.html > > > > Prime-time propaganda > How the White House secretly hooked network TV on its anti-drug message: A >Salon special report. > > - - - - - - - - - - - - > By Daniel Forbes > > Jan. 13, 2000 | Advertisements urging parents to love their kids and keep >them off drugs dot urban bus stops across America. Anti-drug commercials >fill Channel One in the nation's schools and the commercial breaks of >network TV -- most notably a comely, T-shirt-clad waif trashing her kitchen >to demonstrate the dangers of heroin. We've come a long way from Nancy >Reagan's clenched-teeth "Just Say No." > > Few Americans, however, know of a hidden government effort to shoehorn >anti-drug messages into the most pervasive and powerful billboard of all -- >network television programming. > > Two years ago, Congress inadvertently created an enormous financial >incentive for TV programmers to push anti-drug messages in their plots -- as >much as $25 million in the past year and a half, with the promise of even >more to come in the future. Under the sway of the office of President >Clinton's drug czar, Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey, some of America's most popular >shows -- including "ER," "Beverly Hills 90210," "Chicago Hope," "The Drew >Carey Show" and "7th Heaven" -- have filled their episodes with anti-drug >pitches to cash in on a complex government advertising subsidy. > > Here's how helping the government got to be so lucrative. > > In late 1997, Congress approved an immense, five-year, $1 billion ad buy >for anti-drug advertising as long as the networks sold ad time to the >government at half price -- a two-for-one deal that provided over $2 billion >worth of ads for a $1 billion allocation. > > But the five participating networks weren't crazy about the deal from the >start. And when, soon after, they were deluged with the fruits of a booming >economy, most particularly an unexpected wave of dot-com ads, they liked it >even less. > > So the drug czar's office, the White House Office of National Drug Control >Policy (ONDCP), presented the networks with a compromise: The office would >give up some of that precious ad time it had bought -- in return for getting >anti-drug motifs incorporated within specific prime-time shows. That created >a new, more potent strain of the anti-drug social engineering the government >wanted. And it allowed the TV networks to resell the ad time at the going >rate to IBM, Microsoft or Yahoo. > > Alan Levitt, the drug-policy official running the campaign, estimates that >the networks have benefited to the tune of nearly $25 million thus far. > > With this deal in place, government officials and their contractors began >approving, and in some cases altering, the scripts of shows before they were >aired to conform with the government's anti-drug messages. "Script changes >would be discussed between ONDCP and the show -- negotiated," says one >participant. > > Rick Mater, the WB network's senior vice president for broadcast >standards, acknowledges: "The White House did view scripts. They did sign >off on them -- they read scripts, yes." > > The arrangement, uncovered by a six-month Salon News investigation, is >known to only a few insiders in Hollywood, New York and Washington. Almost >none of the producers and writers crafting the anti-drug episodes knew of >the deal. And top officials from the five networks involved last season -- >NBC, ABC, CBS, the WB and Fox -- for the most part refused to discuss it. >The sixth network, UPN, failed to attract the government's interest the >first year of the program; it joined the flock this current TV season. > > The arrangement may violate payola laws that require networks to disclose, >during a show's broadcast, arrangements with any party providing financial >or other considerations, however direct or indirect. (We'll explore that >issue in a separate article Friday.) > > Legal or not, the plan raises a host of questions. "It sounds to me like a >form of propaganda that is, in effect, for sale," says media watchdog Bill >Kovach, curator of the Nieman Foundation. Terming it a "venal practice" and >"a form of mind control," he adds, "It's breathtaking to me that any >[network's] sense of obligation to the viewing audience has a dollar sign >attached to it." > > Andrew Jay Schwartzman, president of the Media Access Project, a public >interest law firm, says, "This is the most craven thing I've heard of yet. >To turn over content control to the federal government for a modest price is >an outrageous abandonment of the First Amendment ... The broadcasters scream >about the First Amendment until McCaffrey opens his checkbook." > > Former FCC chief counsel Robert Corn-Revere, now at the law firm Hogan & >Hartson, calls the campaign "pretty insidious. Government surreptitiously >planting anti-drug messages using the power of the purse raises red flags. >Why is there no disclosure to the American public?" > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > The ONDCP, the powerful executive-branch department from which the >anti-drug effort emanates, is more commonly known as the drug czar's office. >McCaffrey, a Vietnam War hero, directs it and sits on Clinton's Cabinet. > > The office oversees spending of nearly $18 billion annually for such >activities as fighting peasants growing coca in Latin America, helping >interdict drugs entering the United States, local law enforcement and >research and treatment. Though Bob Dole savaged non-inhaler Clinton as weak >on drugs during the 1996 presidential campaign, Clinton has quietly been >Washington's most aggressive anti-drug warrior. Says Dr. Thomas H. Haines, >City University of New York medical school professor and chair of the >Partnership for Responsible Drug Information, "Clinton spent more federal >money in the war on drugs in his first four years than was spent during >Reagan's and Bush's 12 years combined." > > But in the fall of 1997, the most prominent public face of America's >anti-drug crusade belonged to the private Partnership for a Drug-Free >America. With major funding from a foundation fueled by the estate of the >founder of Johnson & Johnson, along with other corporate support, the >partnership bills itself as a "nonpartisan coalition of professionals from >the communications industry." > Founded in 1986, the partnership has garnered hundreds of millions of >dollars a year in donated media space and time, hitting its peak with over >$360 million annually in both 1990 and 1991. But by 1997, donated media had >declined to $222 million, the group was suffering a decrease in both the >quantity and quality of its donated space and time, and the targeted teens >had become inured to its oft-parodied "This is your brain on drugs" message. > > The partnership's chairman, James E. Burke, began to lobby Congress to add >money for paid ads to the drug czar's budget. Though then-House Speaker Newt >Gingrich didn't need much convincing, other Republicans had to overcome two >objections to a new federal expenditure of this size: Some wondered if the >highly visible effort would just let the president and other Democrats claim >credit as crusading anti-drug warriors; others worried about showering money >on Clinton's perceived allies in Hollywood. "Some on the Hill wanted to just >cut a check to the Partnership for a Drug-Free America," says one Capitol >Hill insider. > > Burke and the partnership eventually won the Republicans over. Rep. Jim >Kolbe, R-Ariz., chairman of the House appropriations subcommittee that funds >the media campaign, says, "We were persuaded by the Partnership for a >Drug-Free America to spend tax dollars" to get the message out in prime >time. > > So in October 1997, Congress approved an extravagant plan to buy $1 >billion worth of anti-drug advertising. The drug office got about $200 >million annually for five years, beginning in fiscal year 1998, and was >charged with targeting both the nation's youth and "adult influencers." The >office billed the job in a 1998 press release as "the largest and most >complex social-marketing campaign ever undertaken." > > Approximately two-thirds of the office's ad budget was targeted at TV; the >rest was sprinkled among everything from billboards to radio, newspaper, >magazine and Internet advertising. > > But Congress, feeling that the networks should also contribute to the war >on drugs, drove a hard, two-for-one bargain: for every ad the government >bought, it demanded another of equal value for free. > > "It was contingent on a private-sector match," says John Bridgeland, >former chief aide to Rep. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, who fought for the deal. "No >member of Congress was going to pass new money for this without a match" -- >that is, without that second ad slot. > > Indeed, with only $1 billion budgeted to it by Congress, the office refers >to its "five-year, $2 billion ... campaign." McCaffrey himself called it >"our major prevention initiative, the $2 billion five-year Anti-Drug Media >Campaign." > > The government's paid ads began running on five of the nation's networks, >all but lowly UPN, during the summer of 1998. One TV ad features a scruffy, >plain-spoken teen who boasts of a sterling academic record before succumbing >to marijuana and getting thrown out of the house. Then there's the one >mentioned above: the waif-like Gen-Xer taking a frying pan to her kitchen, >supposedly to demonstrate the terrors of heroin addiction. The actress is >budding young star Rachael Leigh Cook of "She's All That." > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > How did the networks' two-for-one ad deal evolve into a plan to insert >messages into programming content? Bridgeland says that wasn't the original >idea. "I don't think we thought of programming content as a match ... [It] >was not actively discussed," he says -- a point that Kolbe echoes. > > The half-price deal got a mixed reception from the networks. NBC, the most >highly rated network in 1998, with the most valuable ad slots, initially >balked for some three months. The chief ad buyer for the drug czar's office, >Zenith Media Services Inc. CEO Richard Hamilton, oversaw negotiations with >the networks. NBC, he says, made a "business decision." > > Then in the ratings doldrums, ABC had fewer qualms. Says Bart Catalane, >former CFO of ABC Broadcasting: "Given the way ad-spending had been going, >we needed every category, particularly a growing one like government >spending. We wanted to grab every share we could." Indeed, the first year of >the office's ad campaign, ABC grabbed nearly $30 million worth, half again >as much as Fox, its nearest rival at $20 million. > > Even high-flying NBC eventually went along; participants say that the >network came around after hearing about its rivals' barrels of government >cash. Half a loaf was considered better than none, especially from a baker >with a projected five-year supply of flour. "This was before the market got >so tight," says one former contractor to the drug-policy office. "This was >before all the dot-com ads. When we started, the market was less bullish." > > But selling time at half price never went down smoothly, and Hamilton >reported back that the networks weren't happy. Hence, in the spring of 1998, >Alan Levitt, who runs the office's advertising campaign, and Zenith boss >Hamilton cooked up the novel idea of using programming -- that is, the plots >of sitcoms and dramas -- to redeem the second ad slot owed the government. > > "We did this to make it a little bit more obtainable to participants," >Levitt says. "I know it's allowed us to make some deals we wouldn't normally >make before. There are some media outlets that have not been able to -- are >not financially able, or they don't have the structure where they can give >us print space or programming or time. And so we can make it more flexible >for them." > > That spring of 1998, Hamilton and Levitt agreed that sitcoms and dramas >that met with the drug-policy office's approval could be used in lieu of the >ad slots still owed to the government. Formulas would be applied to >determine the cash value of these embedded messages, and the networks would >then be free to resell the commercials they otherwise would have given to >the government. > > Ultimately, the ONDCP developed an accounting system to decide which shows >would be valued and for how much. And its officials began to vet television >shows in advance, sometimes suggesting alterations. Tapes of the show as >broadcast were sent to the office or its ad buyer to be assigned a final >monetary value, which would then be subtracted from the total the particular >network owed the office. > > The drug office and its ad buyers received advance copies of the scripts >from most networks, often more than once as a particular episode developed >over time. In some cases, the networks and the office would wrangle over the >changes requested. Says an office contractor, "You'd see a lot of give and >take: 'Here's the script, what do you think?'" He adds, "I helped out on a >number of scripts. They ran the scripts past us, and we gave comments. We'd >say, 'It's great you're doing this, but inadvertently you're conveying >something'" off-message. > > This contractor prevailed upon the producers of the WB's "Smart Guy" to >change the original script's portrayal of two substance-abusing kids at a >party. They were originally depicted as cool and popular; after the drug >office input, "We showed that they were losers and put them [hidden away to >indulge in shamed secrecy] in a utility room. That was not in the original >script," this contractor says. > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > The scheme worked like this: According to a set, numerical formula, the >drug-policy office assigned financial value to each show's anti-drug >message. If the office decided that a half-hour sufficiently pushed an >endorsed anti-drug theme, it got valued at three "units," with each unit >equaling the cost of one 30-second ad on that show. Hour shows presenting an >approved story line were valued at five units, equal to the cost of five of >that show's 30-second ads. (Ads on higher-rated shows -- shows that deliver >more eyeballs -- cost more. Therefore, shows with higher ratings, which >disseminated ONDCP's message more widely, achieved higher valuations.) > > For example, the drug czar's office bought approximately $20 million of >advertising time from News Corp., the Rupert Murdoch-owned global media >conglomerate that owns Fox. Therefore, News Corp. owed the United States an >additional $20 million in matching ad slots from its inventory of ad time. > > To partially meet its "match," and thus recoup some of the ad time owed >the government, Fox submitted a two-episode "Beverly Hills 90210" story arc >involving a character's downward spiral into addiction. Employing the >formula based on the price of an ad on "90210," the episodes were eventually >valued at between $500,000 and $750,000, says one executive close to the >deal. As Kayne Lanahan, senior VP at News Corp One, Fox's media and >marketing operation, describes it, "There were ongoing discussions with >Zenith. They looked at each episode and how prevalent the story line was." >Lanahan adds, "We occasionally show [them] scripts when they're in >development, and the final script, and then send a tape after it airs." > > This Salon reporter was able to identify some two dozen shows where >specific single or multiple episodes containing anti-drug themes were >assigned a monetary value by the drug czar's office and its two ad buyers: >Zenith and its eventual replacement, Ogilvy & Mather Worldwide. > > In return for, apparently, several episodes with anti-drug subplots, >highly rated "ER" redeemed $1.4 million worth of time for NBC to be able to >sell elsewhere. "The Practice" recouped $500,000 worth of time for ABC to >sell if it wished. And anti-drug messages woven into "90210" redeemed >between $500,000 and $750,000. > > Other shows with episodes that redeemed ad time for the networks during >the 1998-99 season include: "Home Improvement," valued at approximately >$525,000 for ABC; "Chicago Hope," valued at probably $500,000 or more (CBS); >"Sports Night," a valuation of around $450,000 (ABC); "7th Heaven," valued >at around $200,000 (WB); and "The Wayans Bros." with its relatively paltry >ratings, kicking in only approximately $110,000 (WB). > > In addition, the following shows also redeemed ad time last season, though >this reporter could not determine their monetary value: "Promised Land" and >"Cosby" on CBS; "Trinity," "Providence" and several episodes of the four >teen-oriented Saturday-morning live-action shows on NBC; and "The Drew Carey >Show," "Sabrina the Teenage Witch," "Boy Meets World" and "General Hospital" >on ABC. > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > The process unfolded over time, with some scripts reviewed more than once. >When a draft of the script was available, the network sales department would >alert the drug czar's ad buyer. And then the office's Alan Levitt, or his >colleague Jill Bartholomew, became involved. They'd get a copy of the >script -- though ABC maintains it was an exception to this step -- and then >provide "a quick turnaround" with their reactions, says one insider. > > The drug-policy office typically verified the particular episode as being >on-message and appropriate for a match. "If a kid was offered a joint and >said, 'No thanks,' in a way that was on-strategy, it was that simple. It was >a judgment call by the network, the agency and the client," says this >source. > > Other anti-drug, government-endorsed plots were as subtle as a brick >through a window. "Chicago Hope" is owned in part by News Corp. subsidiary >20th Century Fox Television. Though CBS was the potential beneficiary of any >ONDCP-approved "Chicago Hope" episode, an agreeable News Corp. exec, Mark >Stroman, phoned John Tinker, an executive producer on "Chicago Hope," to >request an anti-drug episode. Facing cancellation and commanding scant >leverage with the show's owners, the "Chicago Hope" producers dusted off a >previously rejected script and decided it could stand another rewrite. > > As broadcast, the graphically anti-drug story of the tragedies afflicting >young post-rave revelers featured drug-induced death, rape, psychosis, a >nasty two-car wreck, a broken nose and a doctor's threat to skip life-saving >surgery unless the patient agreed to an incriminating urine test -- along >with a canceled flight on the space shuttle. > > Other drug office-approved shows featured: a career-devastating, >pot-induced freakout of angel-dust proportions ("The Wayans Bros."); blanket >drug tests at work ("The Drew Carey Show") and for a school basketball team >(NBC's Saturday morning "Hang Time"); death behind the wheel due to alcohol >and pot combined ("Sports Night"); kids caught with marijuana or alcohol >pressed to name their supplier ("Cosby" and "Smart Guy"); and a young teen >becoming an undercover police drug informant after a minister, during formal >counseling, tells his parents he should ("7th Heaven"). > > At least one show, "Buffy the Vampire Slayer," was rejected after it >showed itself to be immune to the drug office's worldview. "Drugs were an >issue, but it wasn't on-strategy. It was otherworldly nonsense, very >abstract and not like real-life kids taking drugs. Viewers wouldn't make the >link to our message," says someone in the drug-policy office camp who read >and helped reject it. > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > Levitt, the office's point man on the campaign, downplays the money's >influence on the networks' "voluntary" creative decisions. He likens the >process to the (non-monetary) Prism Awards for socially responsible >television. "The government is not dictating these kinds of changes," he >says. "We will provide an incentive, a financial incentive." > > Levitt insists that his office is trying solely to achieve accurate >portrayals of drugs -- not any overall increase in the number of anti-drug >episodes broadcast. Be that as it may, by the office's own count, the number >of shows with anti-drug themes (whether financially boosted by the office or >not) has risen from 32 as of last March to 109 this winter. > > Whatever the intent of the government program, it was deemed sensitive >enough to be kept under wraps. The TV producers typically knew nothing of >the money involved. Says Levitt, "In almost every instance that I'm aware >of, the [creative] people coming to us have no understanding at all of the >pro bono match. They have no idea." Asked if they should know of the >financial arrangement, Levitt says no: "We're not trying to intrude on their >creative freedom. If the perception is such that we are trying to influence >the [TV] program financially -- well, I won't go any further." > > This reporter spoke with some 20 writers, producers and production >executives for major shows. With perhaps one exception, nobody knew of the >arrangement. > > John Tinker, last season's "Chicago Hope" executive producer, took the >News Corp. call requesting an anti-drug episode. He recalls no mention of >CBS being able to recoup something like half a million dollars in ad time >for the one shrill episode he helped craft at the show owner's request. He >says the financial incentives are "complete news to me." He adds, "I'm so >caught off guard, so stunned. I like to think I'm well informed. I had not a >clue about any financial incentives." Asked if the scheme gave him cause for >concern, Tinker says, "Of course. It smells manipulative ... All of this is >disturbing." > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > Tinker's response would undoubtedly be shared by many in Hollywood's >creative community. One network sales executive who's worked with the >drug-policy office acknowledges that if producers were to learn that scripts >were being altered, that would "start a nightmare." This executive adds, "I >don't need it getting back to [a particular powerhouse producer]. I'm in a >tough situation between the client and the shows." > > Realizing how tough it might get, a lot of top brass shied from trumpeting >their enlistment in the drug war. In a brief conversation, Rosalyn Weinman, >NBC's executive vice president for content policy and East Coast >entertainment, said that the drug office did not exercise "script approval," >but conceded that there had been conversations about broad issues or >"specific concerns." Other NBC officials declined comment. Two other NBC >executives implicitly confirmed the deals, however. > > Senior management and public relations officials at each of the other four >networks involved last season -- ABC, CBS, the WB and Fox -- were contacted, >but offered little in the way of substantive comment. > > While no current Fox executive would comment on the network's cooperation >with the government, Rob Dwek, the network's former executive vice president >of comedy and drama series, maintained that the financial incentives have >"no impact on what we do creatively -- it would have no effect on the >direction of a show ... It's not noticeable, it doesn't hurt the quality of >our product, and it allows us to be responsible." > > An ABC public relations exec, speaking anonymously, confirmed the >network's participation in the deal. "Halfway through the year ['98-'99 >season], ONDCP said we can meet the match ... if programming was >appropriate. I don't know the month. But it was after setting up the >[matching ads] schedule." > > CBS president Leslie Moonves had nothing to say. A CBS spokesman said >simply, "CBS is proud to be working with the government in regard to the war >on drugs." > > Michael Mandelker, executive VP of network sales for UPN, sounded >enthusiastic about the program. Speaking this summer, he said he'd "already >started a dialog with programming. Somewhere there will be shows that >qualify." > > Mandelker said he urged UPN entertainment president Tom Nunan to drum up >support for anti-drug messages with producers, asking him: "Is there a way >to have these kinds of story lines as you talk to producers?" Mandelker >adds, "I imagine ONDCP will look at a couple of scripts in the first year to >make sure our interpretation is theirs." He stated further, referring to >UPN's strategy: "Tom approaches the producers. We [sales] can't do anything >for them. Tom can pick up a show." > > Time Warner CEO Gerald Levin, vice chairman Ted Turner and the WB head >office all declined comment. > > - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > > The drug office's campaign is only just approaching full flower. > > The teen-friendly WB (home to "7th Heaven" and the since-cancelled "The >Wayans Bros.") has, for example, "significantly" expanded its anti-drug >messages, one insider notes, with the drug office more than doubling its WB >buy this season. The WB had initial plans for "at least five" programs with >anti-drug content counting as a match, the source adds. > > "Last year was the program's first year," he points out, "and a lot of >companies didn't understand the match." He predicts the practice will only >increase as the networks come to understand it as an effective way to free >up valuable ad time otherwise sold at half-price. > > > salon.com | Jan. 13, 2000 > > > > - - - - - - - - - - - - > > > > > > ------ > > Washington script doctors > How the government rewrote an episode of the WB's "Smart Guy." > > > - - - - - - - - - - - - > By Daniel Forbes > > > Jan. 13, 2000 | Like much of network television aimed at a youthful >audience, "Smart Guy," a WB network sitcom that went on the air in April >1997 and was cancelled this past spring, was full of lessons about growing >up. It told the story of T.J. Henderson, played by Tahj Mowry, a genius of >sorts who finds himself in high school at the age of 10, grappling with the >pressures that beset his older peers. > > But in the case of one episode, the White House Office of National Drug >Control Policy (ONDCP) thought "Smart Guy's" moral instruction could be made >even more explicit -- and, with the active cooperation of the show's >producers, the government proceeded to do just that. > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > Also Today > > This is your TV on drugs > How the U.S. goverment secretly paid Hollywood to plant anti-drug >propoganda into some of America's most popular television shows. > By Daniel Forbes > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > > > > The original script of the episode, which eventually aired May 19, 1999, >placed T.J. at a kids-only party, where he encounters two older boys he'd >known before he skipped several grades in school. As first conceived, the >two boys were the life of the party, their coolness evidenced among other >things by their precocious ability to score some beer. > > They convince an impressed T.J. to indulge. He returns to the party >sloshed, makes a fool of himself and spills a soda all over a girl he's >trying to dazzle. Hung over the next day, he compounds his sins by lying to >his father about his condition. Later, his new friends drop by with some >peppermint schnapps. Dad walks in on their debaucheries, and all hell breaks >loose. > > The episode was written primarily by freelance film and television writer >Steve Young. Young first pitched the alcohol-themed story in 1997. It was >rejected, he believes, at least in part because Disney (the show's partial >owner) recoiled from having its young character involved with booze. But >well over a year later, Young suddenly received a phone call from "Smart >Guy" executive producer Bob Young (no relation), who told him, "Remember >that show we said we're never going to do? We're doing it." > > The booze-themed script was revived after WB senior VP for programming >John Litvack suggested a drinking or drugs episode to the "Smart Guy's" >producers. (While most of the shows that the drug-policy office influences >deal with drugs, the office permits about 10 percent of them to be >alcohol-related.) > > Says "Smart Guy" creator Danny Kallis: "The WB came to us and asked if >we'd consider doing a drugs or drinking show." Tahj Mowry's mother would >have objected to a show concerning drugs. But fortunately, the producers had >on hand Steve Young's previously rejected script. > > Once the script was resurrected, Kallis recalls that the WB "put us in >touch with the White House, with Alan Levitt [the drug-policy point man for >the media campaign]." "Smart Guy" producer Young says that show staffers >spoke to three or four outsiders on "the most effective way to reach teens," >including Levitt and other social-marketing experts whom Levitt referred >them to. > > ONDCP and its consultants offered "a few dictates," Young says. No mention >of beer brand names. T.J. had to be "clearly inebriated" and the negative >consequences of drinking had to be emphasized, including -- worse even than >T.J.'s embarrassment with the girl -- his breach of trust with his father. >And father and son had to (eventually) have a heart-to-heart talk. > > Writer Young recalls that the scenes in which T.J. is counseled by his >father were crafted with the government consultants' input. He says the >show's producers were "concerned that we didn't say anything that diverges >from" the consultants' paradigm. > > Among the consultants Levitt steered Kallis, Young and their writers to >was George Carey, president of Just Kid Inc. of Stamford, Conn., an expert >on effective youth marketing. Carey says he consulted with ONDCP on "a >couple of shows." Around last February, a couple of months after the >decision to revive the beer episode, Carey participated in a conference call >with the producers of "Smart Guy." He says, "The holding company [the WB] >was looking for ways to fulfill the match" -- i.e. make the show palatable >to the drug czar's office. > > In that phone conference, Carey delineated a few more specific themes dear >to the drug-policy office's heart: Parents need to take an active role, not >just assume kids can handle these issues on their own; "resistance skills," >that is, saying no to drug or alcohol inducements in a face-saving way, are >crucial; and, as always, the overall negative consequences of drugs and >under-age alcohol use. > > Producer Young recalls two or three other ONDCP contractors augmenting >Carey's ministrations to "Smart Guy." By the time everyone was done shaping >the script, it had changed significantly. The two older boys were turned >into goofy and unappealing clowns, one of whom T.J. remembers from the >"slow-reading class." Instead of trying to ingratiate himself with a couple >of winners, as the original script had it, T.J. finds himself dragged down >to their inferior level. A second drug-policy office contractor who worked >on the script says, "We showed that they were losers and put them in a >utility room [rather than out in the main party]. That was not in the >original script." > > Asked whether it's proper to have government consultants shaping a TV >program's scripts, WB programming chief Litvack says, "Sure, absolutely. >It's a good idea if he knows more than we do." > > > > About the writer > Daniel Forbes is a New York freelancer who writes on social policy and the >media. > > > > >================================================================ > >This message is sent to you because you are subscribed to > the mailing list . >To unsubscribe, E-mail to: